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FROM LITIGATORS OF ORDINARY CASES TO
LITIGATORS OF EXTRAORDINARY CASES:
STRATIFICATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Herbert M. Kritzer*
INTRODUCTION
The legal profession is a popular icon in American and other west-
ern cultures. As such, it is often associated with what is wrong or
problematic about society. Political leaders and commentators who
draw on the profession's iconic value typically present the profession
as a unitary body that stands in opposition to many of the interests of
the broader society. So, for example, the profession is often attacked
for simply defending the interests of lawyers at the cost of the larger
society. In his 2000 campaign for the presidency of the United States,
George W. Bush took aim at the profession as clearly stated in the
Republican Party Platform:
Reform of the legal profession is an essential part of court re-
form. Today's litigation practices make a mockery of justice, hinder
our country's competitiveness in the world market and, far worse,
erode the public's trust in the entire judicial process....
Avarice among many plaintiffs' lawyers has clogged our civil
courts, drastically changed the practice of medicine, and costs
American companies and consumers more than $150 billion a year.
... We fully support the role of the courts in vindicating the rights
of individuals and organizations, but we want to require higher stan-
dards for trial lawyers within federal jurisdiction, much as Governor
Bush has already done in Texas - and as we encourage other States
to do within their own legal codes. To achieve that goal, we will
strengthen the federal rules of civil procedure to increase penalties
* Professor of Political Science and Law, and Director, Legal Studies Program, University of
Wisconsin-Madison; B.A., 1969, Haverford College; Ph.D., 1974, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill. This paper was prepared for the Seventh Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort
Law and Social Policy, DePaul University College of Law, April 5-6, 2001; an expanded version,
including more extensive material on developments in England, was presented at the W.G. Hart
Workshop at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, London, June 26-28, 2001. 1 would like
to thank John Heinz and Rebecca Sandefur of the American Bar Foundation for making availa-
ble some unpublished materials from the 1995 survey of the Chicago Bar. I would particularly
like to thank Rebecca Sandefur for running some statistical analyses of those data.
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for frivolous suits and impose a "Three Strikes, You're Out" rule on
attorneys who repeatedly file such suits....
To protect clients against unscrupulous lawyers, we will enact a
Clients' Bill of Rights for all federal courts, requiring attorneys to
disclose both the range of their fees and their ethical obligation to
charge reasonable fees and allowing those fees to be challenged in
federal courts. Because private lawyers should not unreasonably
profit at public expense, we will prohibit federal agencies from pay-
ing contingency fees and encourage states to do so as well. Even
more important, we will require attorneys to return to the people
any excessive fees they gain under contract to States or
municipalities.1
While the target was often plaintiffs' lawyers, these attacks typically
referred to lawyers, rather than to "trial" lawyers.2 Similarly, Marc
Galanter's analysis of lawyer jokes and humor often places lawyers in
particular settings, but the jokes seldom recognize differences among
lawyers. 3
While the public does not typically draw a lot of distinctions among
groups within the legal profession, other than occasional distinctions
between "my" lawyer who is trying to help me versus the "other
guy's" lawyer who is trying to screw me,4 scholars have long recog-
nized that the legal profession is far from a politically or economically
united interest. Recognized lines of stratification include social class
and ethnic origins, as well as clientele.
This essay suggests that it is time to recognize a new line of stratifi-
cation, one that exists within what is traditionally labeled the "plain-
tiffs' bar." While there have always been important lines of differen-
tiation among those lawyers who handle personal injury claims for in-
jury victims, changes in the nature of some areas of personal injury
1. Republican Nat'l Comm., Republican Platform available at http://www.rnc.org/GOPInfo/
Platform/2000platform7 (last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
2. While campaigning for the presidency in 1992, George H.W. Bush singled out the plaintiffs'
bar:
You know I'm not anti-lawyer, but let me tell you something. We spend up to $200
billion every year on direct costs to lawyers. Japan doesn't spend this; Germany
doesn't. And I want to take on those ambulance chasers and reform our lawsuit-happy
legal system. You see, when doctors are afraid to practice, when people are afraid to
help somebody along the highway, when coaches are afraid to coach Little League, my
message is this: As a nation, we must sue each other less and care for each other more.
George H.W. Bush, Remarks to the Community in Holland, Michigan (Oct. 12, 1992) available at
http://www.bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/l1992/92101203.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
3. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and
Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 830 (1998).
4. Some people are just plain "anti-lawyer"; see, for example, the website of the "Anti-Law-
yer Party" at http://wevote.com/pages/antilaw.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
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litigation, epitomized by the spectacular success of litigation targeting
tobacco companies, have created very significant lines of cleavage that
either did not previously exist or that could be submerged within a
broader common interest of the plaintiffs' bar. Thus, where in the
past prominent lawyers such as Joe Jamail or Phil Corboy might be
admired for their success in litigating high profile and high fee cases
(Jamail received a reported $300 million or so from his representation
of Pennzoil in its suit against Texaco), 5 today, lawyers such as Stanley
Chesley, Joe Rice, Walter Gauthier, Robert Habush, Michael Ciresi,
and John O'Quinn are becoming controversial figures within the
plaintiffs' bar, as well as beyond it.
II. CLEAVAGE AND STRATIFICATION WITHIN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
As noted above, while much of the public may view the legal pro-
fession as a unitary group, thoughtful observers and scholars have
long recognized that the profession is highly fractured. In fact, the
legal profession as a single entity is a relatively recent development.
Within England, there is still a formal distinction between solicitors
and barristers.6 Those two branches of the profession emerged
through an evolutionary process of merger among a wide variety of
specialized groups, including attorneys, scriviners, conveyancers,
King's Counsel, sergeants-at-law, and proctors, as well as barristers
and solicitors. 7 While merger and evolution within the English legal
profession left only the two branches at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, 8 solicitors and barristers remained highly distinct in
terms of both class origins and training. The solicitor's branch was a
means of attaining professional status for the sons of the merchant
and middle class, largely through a system of apprenticeship. In con-
trast, the barrister's branch was an occupational outlet for the sons of
the gentry (particularly second and later sons who would not inherit
the family estate). Such preparation typically involved first obtaining
a classical education through "public" schools and degrees from elite
universities, followed by a period of gentlemanly association at the
Inns of Court where the barristers-to-be attended dinners to listen to
5. See Andrew Blum, The $400 Million Man?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 1988, at 2.
6. BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965 14-17 (1967).
7. Id.
8. Actually, there is a small, relatively unique third profession, scrivener-notaries. See Gisela
Shaw, Notaries in England and Wales: Modernising a Profession Frozen in Time, 7 INT'L J. OF
LEGAL PROFESSION 141, 142-43 (2000).
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barristers tell them about the art of advocacy. While today, entry into
both branches is typically through a university education in law,9 ele-
ments of these distinctions, particularly the class-related aspects,
remain.
A. Traditional Approaches
In the United States, class and ethnicity have been a central line of
cleavage within the profession at least since the latter part of the nine-
teenth century. In the first fifty to seventy-five years after indepen-
dence from England, the legal profession was represented by the
image of lawyers like Abraham Lincoln who learned the law through
personal study and apprenticeship.' 0 By the latter part of the century,
the growth of the corporation and the demands for legal services it
created led to growing distinctions between lawyers who served the
corporate interests and those who worked on behalf of individuals and
small businesses. This coincided with the growth of university-based
legal education, the organization of the American Bar Association,
and pressures to regularize legal training and control entry into the
profession. During this period, one saw developments such as the
case-method of legal education and the beginnings of the "Cravath"
system for corporate law firms.11  In some ways, the growing rift
within the profession between those lawyers who championed the in-
terests of workers and the common man and those who derived their
income from corporations was epitomized by the controversy over
Louis Brandeis's nomination to become the first Jewish person to sit
on the United States Supreme Court. Brandeis represented the rise of
the immigrant class, although, in fact, Brandeis was from a German-
Jewish family that immigrated to the United States before the Civil
War. 12 Until well after World War II, it was common to explicitly ex-
clude Jews (and other undesirables) from the "white shoe" corporate
firms.13 Even in the late twentieth century and the beginning of the
9. RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 263-66 (1988); see
also Herbert M. Kritzer, Abel and the Professional Project: The Institutional Analysis of the Legal
Profession, 16 LAW & Soc. INO. 529, 547-48 (1991).
10. This is not to say that the public perception of lawyers was necessarily positive. One
aspect of the Jacksonian period was strong opposition to a legal profession as contrary to demo-
cratic principles as envisioned by the Jacksonians. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 251 (1950); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQ-
UITY TO MODERN TIMES: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAR As-
SOCIATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES 236-39 (1953).
11. Id. at 306-08.
12. PHILLIPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 1-4 (1984).
13. See ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION
MAN? 44 (1964); Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Transformation of the Big Law Firm, in
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twenty-first century, these firms are much more likely to draw from
the ranks of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants than is the profession as a
whole. 14
The most extensive research on stratification in the American legal
profession is the work of John Heinz, Edward Laumann, and Robert
Nelson. Heinz, Laumann, and Nelson's seminal study of the Chicago
bar as of 1975 showed that among lawyers one could identify two dis-
tinct "hemispheres," one oriented toward serving large corporate cli-
ents (and their wealthy owners and executives) and one oriented to
"personal services" (or "personal plight"), including the needs of
small family businesses.15 Lawyers in the corporate-services hemi-
sphere were more likely to come from "establishment" backgrounds,
while those in the personal services sector came more from ethnic,
working class, and lower middle class backgrounds. The former were
likely to have attended elite or near elite law schools, while the latter
were likely to have attended state university law schools or law
schools associated with other local universities. A replication of the
1975 study, twenty years later, showed that the basic cleavage per-
sisted.16 Perhaps the most important change was that the corporate
hemisphere is consuming an increasing share of legal effort. Where
corporate services comprised just over half of legal effort in 1975;17 by
1995, it consumed about two-thirds of legal effort."'
A second change noted by Heinz and his colleagues relates to an-
other line of distinction among lawyers, fields of specialization. The
Cravath system marked the beginning of specialization within the
American bar as we have come to know it today. Heinz and his col-
leagues report that substantive fields were more distinct in the 1990s
than they were in the 1970s, an indicator of ever increasing substan-
LAWYERS' IDEALJLAWYERS' PRACTI-ICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFES-
SION 31, 39 (Robert Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
14. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR 136 (2d ed., 1994) (1982). Heinz and his colleagues report that the amount of
cleavage along "ethnoreligious" lines declined between 1975 and 1995 within the Chicago bar,
but "a considerable amount of ethnoreligious difference . . .remains"; American Bar Founda-
tion, Taking Stock: Structural Transformations in the Legal Profession and Legal Practice, 12
RESEARCHING L.: AN ABF UPDATE 1, 2 (2001).
15. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 14, at 127-39. Observers of the profession had noted this
cleavage early in the twentieth century. See ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PRO-
FESSION OF THE LAW 237-39 (1921).
16. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and
1995, 32 L. & Soc'y REV. 751, 770-74 (1998).
17. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 14, at 24.
18. Heinz et al., supra note 16, at 765.
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tive specialization among lawyers.' 9 There is a fairly clear pecking or-
der among specializations with fields most closely linked to work for
large corporations (securities, tax, anti-trust, patents) at the top and
fields like divorce and landlord-tenant at the bottom. 20
In an analysis of the 1995 Chicago data, Sandefur and Heinz suggest
that the market for legal services is becoming more competitive and
may be moving toward a "winner-take-all" market. 21 Winner-take-all
markets have two distinguishing characteristics: high rewards are
highly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of top
performers, and those rewards are distributed on the basis of relative,
as well as absolute performance. 22 Sandefur and Heinz presented evi-
dence showing a huge difference in incomes between the top 10% of
performers23 and the middle 10%.24 Drawing on national census data
to compare 1970 and 1990, they reported that the skew (measured as
the ratio of the mean to the median) is increasing, going from 1.13 to
1.28;25 for their own Chicago bar data, the corresponding ratio for
1995 is 1.56.26 Sandefur and Heinz also reported that the impact of
income on lawyers' satisfaction with their income is linked to market
position with those lawyers working in settings with clear pathways of
advancement, such as partnership in a corporate law firm, less af-
fected by current income than those in less predictable settings (i.e.,
practices focused largely on personal services). Using logistic regres-
sion, the authors found that the odds of being satisfied or very satis-
fied with income is multiplied by 1.11 for lawyers in "high business
fields" for each additional $10,000 of income, 1.13 for lawyers in "mid-
dle business fields," and 1.20 for lawyers in "low business fields. '27
19. For lawyers with substantial practice in some areas, the substantive area is the primary
basis of distinction rather than client base. In those areas, it is common for lawyers to have both
business and nonbusiness clients, although the business clients may be of the family business
variety.
20. HEINz & LAIJMANN, supra note 14, at 91; see Rebecca Sandefur, Work and Honor in the
Law: Prestige and the Division of Lawyers' Labor, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 382, 386-87 (2001).
21. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & JOHN P. HEINZ, WINNER-TAKE-ALL MARKETS FOR LEGAL
SERVICES AND LAWYERS' JOB SATISFACI'ION (1999) (Am. B. Found., Working Paper No. 9906,
1999). The argument is based in part on ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER
TAKE ALL SoCIErY: WHY THE FEW AT THE Top GET So MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF Us
(1995).
22. In other words, being just a little better makes a big difference.
23. The mean income is estimated at $537,000. Id. at 5.
24. The mean income is estimated at about $82,000. Id.
25. Id. at 34, tbl. 1.
26. Id. at 36, tbl. 1.
27. These multipliers were obtained by exponentiating the logistic regression coefficients
shown in Table 6. Id. at 39, tbl. 6. This is a standard way of interpreting logistic regression
results. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation
Seeking in Canada and the United States, 25 L. & Soc'Y REV. 499, 538-39 (1991).
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Using these results, they estimated that 42% of those making $45,000
while working in a "high business field" are satisfied or very satisfied
with their incomes, compared to only 32% of those in "low business
fields"; for those making $162,500, 71% and 80% respectively are sat-
isfied or very satisfied in "high" and "low" business fields. 28 The au-
thors found an even larger gap in looking at a second question dealing
with the lawyers' satisfaction concerning their chances of advance-
ment; on this question, there is relatively little variation dependent on
income for lawyers in practices with high or middling business content
(spread from 48% satisfied to 60% satisfied), but quite substantial va-
riation for lawyers in practices in "low business fields" (spread from
39% satisfied to 80% satisfied).
B. Traditional Perspectives on Stratification in the Plaintiffs' Bar
While most research on stratification in the legal profession has dis-
tinguished among lawyers from different types of backgrounds or
serving different types of clients, a number of scholars have recog-
nized that there are distinctions to be drawn within the plaintiffs' bar
itself. While not specifically focused on the plaintiffs' bar per se, Je-
rome Carlin's study of solo practitioners devoted significant attention
to lawyers handling personal injury claims. 29 Carlin distinguishes be-
tween what he calls the "lower" and "upper" segments of the solo bar
handling personal injury cases. 30 Lawyers in the lower segment drew
their clients largely from a neighborhood or ethnic base and were
most likely to handle personal injury cases in the context of a general
practice; 3' lawyers in this lower segment were very concerned about
competition for clients.32 In contrast, the "upper" segments of the
solo personal injury bar tended to be specialists who frequently drew
clients through "suppliers," including referrals from other lawyers; 33
these lawyers were much less concerned about competition for cli-
ents.34 Ross's study of the settlement of automobile accident claims
also found a clear distinction between lawyers who handled these
cases as part of a general practice and those who specialized in negli-
28. SANDEFUR & HEINZ, supra note 21, at 39, tbl. 6.
29. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS
IN CHICAGO 71-91 (1962).
30. Id. at 114-16.
31. Most, if not all, of the lawyers in Carlin's study were male.
32. CARLIN, supra note 29, at 88-89.
33. Id. at 82-91.
34. Id. at 89-90.
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gence cases. 35 In his analysis of claims outcome, Ross found that spe-
cialists, which he defined in terms of membership in the predecessor
to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, obtained recoveries
that on average were considerably higher than those obtained by
other lawyers.36 Rosenthal, in his study of representation in personal
injury claims, again found specialists to be more likely (67%) to ob-
tain a "good" result than non-specialists (47%).37 The difference be-
tween specialists and non-specialists is by no means limited to the
American context, as clearly shown by Genn's study of personal injury
claims in England. 38
More recent studies of the plaintiffs' bar have emphasized the role
of "markets" and link markets to specialization. During the period
that Carlin, Ross, and Rosenthal were writing, the market for legal
representation for injured persons was essentially local. While there
were some occasional exceptions, they typically came through net-
works of lawyer referrals for fairly rare and high profile cases, such as
those arising out of air crash disasters. Advertising and modern com-
munication has changed that. Today, markets for legal services are
bounded largely by limitations on legal practice, such as admission to
state bars. Instate regional or statewide marketing by plaintiffs' law-
yers is now commonplace. Furthermore, certain types of plaintiffs'
litigation, most prominently medical malpractice, have come to re-
quire increasing levels of substantive expertise combined with signifi-
cant resources for experts and trial preparation. The result is that the
market for personal injury representation is now tiered along several
dimensions: geography, size of claim, and substantive expertise. This
is most clearly explicated in Van Hoy's study of the plaintiffs' bar in
Indiana; Van Hoy distinguished among lawyers who have a local ver-
sus statewide client base, lawyers who handle special areas such as
medical malpractice and products liability and who tend to be state-
wide in their practices, and lawyers who limit their practices to "signif-
35. H. LAURENCE Ross, S E-rLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 75-78 (1980).
36. Id. at 167.
37. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 134 (1974).
38. HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETLEMENT IN PERSONAL INJURY
ACIiONS (1987). 1 should note, however, that my own analysis of plaintiffs' success in cases
actually filed in court, albeit in a study not limited to personal injury cases or personal plight
cases, did not show any impact of lawyer specialization or lawyer experience; specialization did
improve success from the viewpoint of the contingency fee lawyer. See HERBERT M. KRITZER,
THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 135 (1990). However, in another
study, which did include contingent fee lawyers in one setting, I did find that specialization was a
very significant factor in effectiveness. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAW-
YERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 170-86 (1998).
[Vol. 51:219
STRATIFICATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR
icant" injuries, which he defined as those involving damages of
$15,000 or more, versus those whose practices are primarily composed
of "moderate-value injuries. ' 39 While moderate-value, personal in-
jury practices tend to be local in their geographic markets, this is by
no means necessarily the case, particularly for high volume firms that
rely on extensive advertising. Many of the patterns reported by Van
Hoy are also described by Daniels and Martin in their study of the
Texas plaintiffs' bar.40
III. THE CHANGED NATURE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR
The dimensions of market, specialization, and substantial versus
moderate injuries only begin to capture the nature of the stratification
that has emerged in the plaintiffs' bar over the last decade. While the
vast majority of claims handled by lawyers are well below six figures,
today we are seeing cases that can involve nine, ten, or eleven, or in
the case of the tobacco litigation, twelve figures: $206,000,000,000 in
the national tobacco settlement 41 or $145,000,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages awarded by a jury in a Florida class action jury verdict.42 While
these are extreme, they do epitomize the gap that has developed be-
tween routine and even very significant litigation, such as "bad baby"
medical malpractice cases, and extraordinary cases. What is signifi-
cant here is that the biggest are getting so big as to represent a differ-
ent world entirely, different even from what Deborah Hensler has
characterized in terms of multiple worlds of tort litigation;43 rather
than "multiple worlds" of litigation, perhaps we need to start thinking
about "multiple solar systems" or "multiple universes."
In its 2001 survey of the largest jury verdicts for the year 2000, the
National Law Journal listed sixteen verdicts, not including the Florida
tobacco case,44 ranging from a low of $32.9 million to $122.59 mil-
lion.45 Data reported by Jury Verdict Research (JVR) showed that
39. Jerry Van Hoy, Markets and Contingency: How Client Markets Influence the Work of
Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Lawyers, 6 INT'L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 345-46, 357-58, 360-62 (1999).
40. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "It's Darwinism-Survival of the Fittest:" How Markets
and Reputations Shape the Way in Which Plaintiffs' Lawyers Obtain Clients, 21 LAW & POL'Y
377, 380-82 (1999).
41. Barry Meir, Cig. Makers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998,
at Al.
42. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Husband-Wife Team Take On the Tobacco Goliath and Walks Away
with a Monster Jury Award, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 2001, at C14.
43. Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves: What's Going on in the Civil
Liability System?, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 140, 141 (1993).
44. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
45. The mean is at $63 million. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Despite 2000 Slump, Juries Remain
Bullish, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 2001, at C3, C26.
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about 12% of personal injury verdicts exceed $1 million, and that per-
centage is growing; JVR also found that the median personal injury
verdict has been stable over the last seven years at $50,000.46 This is
particularly noteworthy given that JVR's database tends to be slanted
toward larger cases because of its manner of data collection.47 Re-
search has shown clearly that verdicts reported in the press are
skewed toward the larger cases;48 most people realize that typical jury
verdicts are in the thousands rather than the millions.49 However, the
visibility of large, and now occasionally astronomical, verdicts high-
lights that there is something different going on in at least some types
of litigation.
Patterns of Change
One of the first indicators that change in structure of the plaintiffs'
bar is evident is the growth of bureaucratic structures in a small seg-
ment of the bar. This growth is actually happening at both the bottom
and the top of the case universe. At the bottom, there are now firms
designed specifically to process high volumes of low value cases. Van
Hoy describes one such firm in Indiana:
46. Andrew Harris, Report Maps Million Dollar Verdict States, NAT'L L.J., Feb.12, 2001, at
A4.
47. A study of jury verdicts in the 75 largest counties in the United States for 1996 found the
median verdict in tort cases to be $31,000, and that only 5.8% of the tort verdicts exceeded $1
million. CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICIS IN
LARGE COUNTIES 1996 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf
(last visited Jan. 5, 2002). These figures actually constitute a decline from 1992, when the compa-
rable figures for the same counties were $51,000 and 7.8%. Carol J. DeFrances et al., Civil Jury
Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1992 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Washington D.C.), July 1995, at 5, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
48. See Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 763, 772-774 (1995); Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with
the Media as Your Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64, 66 (1996).
49. In a recent national survey (n=1,566), I asked respondents,
In addition to deciding guilt and innocence in criminal trials, juries are used in the U. S.
to determine liability and the amount of money to be paid in compensation for dam-
ages in noncriminal cases. From what you know, can you give me an estimate of the
typical or average amount of money that juries award in a personal injury case of the
type that arises from auto accidents, injuries from defective products, medical negli-
gence and the like?
About 40% replied that they could not give an estimate; of the 60% of respondents who did give
an estimate, the median was $100,000; 23.8% of the respondents who could provide an estimate
gave a figure of $1 million or more. Eight respondents gave a figure exceeding $100 mil-
lion-which seems absurd until you recall that the survey was in the field around the time of the
Florida tobacco verdict! See Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Perceptions of Civil Trial Verdicts, 85
JUDICATURE 78, 80 (2001).
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Greg operates a mass advertising, mass production personal injury
practice that is focused almost completely on the firm's home mar-
ket. The firm employs "about seven secretaries that we train our-
selves" who screen the 75-100 calls the firm receives each day from
the local television, radio, and telephone book advertising. The sec-
retaries, who are supervised by Greg and one associate attorney, are
responsible for working most case files until settlement.50
My own interviews with plaintiffs' lawyers in Wisconsin involved con-
tact with lawyers in several such firms; one of those lawyers described
how his practice operated by tracing a hypothetical case:
After our initial interview you would go into an interview room.
Now I turn it over to a paralegal. She takes the background, she
fills out a bunch of forms, finds out all the doctors, where you live,
medical background, medical authorizations, has you sign a retainer
agreement, wage authorizations, takes pictures of injuries, and then
the file goes into our, for lack of a better term, assembly line. We
put it into a fairly sophisticated assembly line. Someone takes the
interview; it gets entered into a computer system. It starts then go-
ing to various different places. If your case, which in a case like this
would need investigation, the file including the interview and police
report would go to one of the investigators who would immediately
try to get statements and interviews, and pin down the facts. We
would set it up; we would confirm the insurance. All the people
working on the case at this point are nonlawyers ... the interviewer
is a nonlawyer, investigator is a nonlawyer, and everyone is given
the following mission: Number one, look at the case, look at the
case, look at the case. What risk do we take, what is the assessment
of the risk. These persons are trained to look at the files because
lawyers will take cases because they want numbers, they want to say
I'm a big rainmaker, I've got a lot of cases. So, the paralegals are
trained to go to our managing partner and say this is a case I'm
involved in and I don't think it looks like a good liability situation, I
don't think it looks like a good risk, I don't think there's insurance, I
don't think there's a mode of recovery here, the person doesn't ap-
pear that injured, and they are told to bring to us and review with us
what they think of the case. They know cases as well as lawyers
know cases. And we find that clients will tell them [paralegals] stuff
that they won't tell us [lawyers].51
50. Van Hoy, supra note 39, at 345.
51. More details on this study can be found in several articles based on the research of Her-
bert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICA-
TURE 22 (1997) [hereinafter Kritzer, Gatekeepers]; Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The
Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 284-303 (1998) [hereinafter
Kritzer, Wages of Risk]; Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settle-
ment Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship,
23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 795, 813 (1998); Herbert M. Kritzer & Jayanth Krishnan, Lawyers
Seeking Clients, Clients Seeking Lawyers: Sources of Contingency Fee Cases and Their Implica-
tions for Case Handling, 21 LAW & POL'Y 347, 349 (1999).
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While these firms are bureaucratic in how they operate, they typically
involve a small number of lawyers. Galanter has attributed the small
size of plaintiffs' firms to a combination of factors, including the per-
sonality of lawyers who are very successful as contingency fee liti-
gators ("the 'alpha male' characteristics of many of the most
successful plaintiffs' lawyers") 52 and the nature of the capital involved
in plaintiffs' firms, which typically has been highly dependent on the
name of an individual lawyer.
However, at the top end of the spectrum, this is changing. 53 One
aspect of this change is the shift from the individual charisma of the
star litigator toward what is more equivalent to "brand names" tied to
a firm rather than to an individual lawyer. A firm that has accom-
plished this in Wisconsin is Habush, Habush, Davis, and Rottier
(HHDR). HHDR, with ten offices around Wisconsin and over thirty
attorneys,54 relies upon a large advertising budget, along with a well-
earned reputation for successful representation.55 However, while
most lawyer advertising focuses on showing pictures of the lawyers,
HHDR's advertising tends to focus on satisfied clients by showing pic-
tures of smiling families. HHDR uses a combination of television, ra-
dio, and Yellow Pages advertising, 56 and a significant fraction of the
Wisconsin population will spontaneously name the Habush firm as a
law firm to contact in case of accidental injury.57 In fact, a report
about a baseball park construction accident noted that one of the vic-
tims of the accident had specifically told his wife some days before his
death, in a premonition of what was to happen, "If anything ever hap-
pens to me, I want you to call Bob Habush. '58 HHDR's prominence
in Wisconsin is further reflected in the fact that it was one of three
firms, probably the lead firm, representing the State of Wisconsin in
52. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discon-
tents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 471 (1998).
53. On the changing scale of practice on the corporate services side see JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL.,
THE SCALE OF JUsrICE: OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN LAW PRACTICE
(1999) (American Bar Foundation Working Paper #9907); MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PA-
LAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE Bic LAW FIRM (1991).
54. Information from the firm website, available at http://www.habush.com (last visited March
14, 2001).
55. One of the cases listed among the National Law Journal's top verdicts of 2000 was a $99
million dollar award arising from a construction accident at a new baseball park in Milwaukee.
Robert Habush was the lawyer who won that award.
56. It has an advertisement on the back cover of the telephone book in most larger towns and
cities in Wisconsin.
57. Kritzer & Krishnan, supra note 51, at 355.
58. Robert L. Habush, A 'Typically Relentless' Approach Wins Big, NAT'L L.J., July 16, 2001,
at C9.
[Vol. 51:219
2001] STRATIFICATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR 231
the tobacco litigation that led to the $206 billion multi-state settle-
ment, earning a third or more of the resulting $75 million fee.
Law firms that litigate huge, complex cases, such as tobacco, breast
implant, and the like, require staff and financial resources beyond the
scale of the traditional plaintiffs' firms. It is no accident that HHDR
was involved in the tobacco litigation; it could bankroll the litigation
and even absorb a loss if that had been the end result. It is also no
accident that around the country, it was firms such as Robins, Kaplan,
Miller & Ciresi in Minnesota, or Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson
& Poole in South Carolina, that played lead roles in the tobacco litiga-
tion. These firms have both experience in complex litigation and the
extensive resources, both in terms of people and money, to handle
such cases and their attendant risks. For example, Ness Motley built
its resources through its major role in the asbestos litigation that burst
onto the national scene twenty years ago. It is an area that continues
to be a major part of the firm's practice. Today, Ness Motley is a firm
of over seventy lawyers, employs a sizeable support staff, and has a
practice of national proportions. 59 Robins Kaplan, a firm of two hun-
dred lawyers, three hundred support personnel, and offices in five
states and Washington, DC, is somewhat different in that its practice
goes well beyond personal injury to include business litigation and
other areas of business practice; nonetheless, Robins Kaplan lists
sixty-six lawyers as practicing in the areas of personal injury, medical
malpractice, mass torts, and catastrophe litigation.60 Unlike Ness
Motley, Robbins Kaplan has long approached plaintiffs' practice in a
way that resembles a corporate firm more than the traditional small
plaintiffs' firm headed by a single star litigator. At the time that
named partner Michael Ciresi was handling hundreds of Dalkon
Shield and Copper-7 IUD cases in the 1980s, the firm already had two
hundred lawyers, and the importance of these resources was begin-
ning to be recognized; in the words of another lawyer handling large
numbers of Copper-7 cases, "Robins, Kaplan is a big firm, and it had
the resources to stand toe to toe with Searle .... They were able to
make the case. We weren't. ' 61 The importance of the resources of a
firm like Robins Kaplan was captured in a news article about the hir-
ing of a top litigator, Jim Fetterly, who specializes in catastrophe
59. While the firm has offices in only four states, lawyers in the firm are licensed to practice in
20 states.
60. Information obtained from the Robins Kaplan website, available at http://www.rkmc.com
(visited March 13, 2001).
61. Julia Flynn Sier, Liability Litigator: Michael Ciresi; Winning with Hard Work and Histrion-
ics, N.Y. TIMES, October 9, 1988, § 3, at 6.
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cases, such as the MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas. Fetterly closed his
own ten-attorney boutique firm because the resources required to re-
present clients had begun to exceed the firm's ability to finance
cases.
62
While in some ways Robins Kaplan is unique, in others it is not.
There is an increasing number of firms that specialize in litigation in a
way that includes both large scale commercial litigation (typically
done on an hourly basis) and high visibility plaintiffs' class action done
on a contingency basis. Such firms include Boies, Schiller & Flexner
with one hundred lawyer offices in ten cities,63 and Susman Godfrey
with more than fifty lawyers headquartered in Houston.64 In addition,
there are firms that specialize in plaintiffs' class action such as Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein with forty-five lawyers based in San
Francisco and Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley with sixteen law-
yers based in Cincinnati.
Central to all of these firms is resources: the ability to bring to bear
substantial legal effort and to deal with the cost of extended, monster-
scale litigation. These are repeat players in the truest sense of the
concept. 65 Like the traditional repeat players on the defense, they are
in the game for the long term and have the resources to sustain cases
that, until recently, would have bankrupted virtually any lawyer or
plaintiffs' law firm.66 While in the past, one might have started with
the assumption that the defendant had the resources to swamp the
plaintiff, these firms have accumulated sufficient capital through ma-
jor victories in cases such as asbestos, tobacco, Dalkon Shield, etc., so
that it may well be the plaintiff that is in the stronger resource posi-
tion. Having greater resources does not ensure victory, as evidenced
by the lack of success in recent cases brought against the gun industry
by lawyers bankrolled with tobacco winnings, 67 but losing is some-
thing these firms can now afford.
62. David Phelps, Robins, Kaplan Catastrophic Group Adds Firepower of Top Litigator Jim
Fetterly, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), January 28, 2001 at D1.
63. Michael D. Goldhaber, Boies Schiller's Big Year, NAT'L L.J., February 12, 2001 at Al.
64. Information from firm website, available at http://susmangodfrey.com/Defaulth.htm, (last
visited March 14, 2001).
65. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97-98 (1974).
66. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL AcroN 123-32 (1995).
67. See Bob Van Voris, Gun Cases Use Tobacco Know-How; the Sequel, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7,
1998, at Al; Richard Turbin, Gun Manufacturers in Plaintiffs' Sights, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at
B20; Elizabeth Amon, Cincinnati Gun Suit Fires a Dud, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, at A10; Robert
Levy, Blackmail of Gun Makers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A20; Shannon P. Duffy, Philly
Loses Its Gun Maker Suit, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 2001 at A4.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR
While competition is nothing new within the plaintiffs' bar, it now
functions in a way that differs from competition of the past. The
plaintiffs' firms with large bankrolls have a capability to dominate the
market for profitable cases in a way that was not previously possible.
The largest of the bankrolls has accrued to the firms that took on the
tobacco cases, and they are now beginning to use those bankrolls to
open new avenues of litigation.
Traditionally, within a highly competitive market for clients and
cases, the plaintiffs' bar has nonetheless seen itself as sharing common
interests: the need for sympathetic judges,68 the need for rules that
favor plaintiffs,69 restrictions on client solicitation and advertising, and
general opposition to various aspects of tort reform, such as limita-
tions on the contingent fee, limitations on various types of damages,
such as punitive damages, noneconomic damages, changes to the
American rule on fee shifting, eliminating joint and several liability,
and statutes of repose. The general assumption is that if a change
might hurt some plaintiffs' lawyers' clients and, thus, hurt those law-
yers themselves, it must be bad for all plaintiffs and all plaintiffs' law-
yers. In fact, what is in the interest of one segment of the plaintiffs'
bar need not be in the interest of other segments.
A. Income Stratification
The "winner-take-all" market discussed above presents one line of
cleavage within the bar. Recall Sandefur and Heinz's analysis of the
relationship between income and satisfaction with income: they esti-
mated that 40% of those making $45,000 working in a "high business
field" are satisfied or very satisfied with their incomes, compared to
only 32% of those in "low business fields"; for those making $162,500,
72% and 80% respectively are satisfied or very satisfied in "high" and
"low" business fields.70 At my request, Rebecca Sandefur reran the
analysis for lawyers who devoted 25% or more of their practice to
plaintiffs' personal injury work and for those who devoted 50% or
more to this area. While the number of respondents was small, forty-
eight and thirty-seven for the two groups respectively, the impact of
income was much greater than for even the low business fields group
68. See RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND
BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN (1969); Anthony
Champagne & Kyle Cheek, PACs and Judicial Politics in Texas, 80 JUDICATURE 26, 26 (1996).
69. Albert Lipson, California Enacts Prejudgment Interest: A Case Study of Legislative Ac-
tion (1984) [RAND Report].
70. SANDEFUR & HEINZ, supra note 21.
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looked at by Sandefur and Heinz. For those whose practice was 50%
or more plaintiffs' personal injury, an estimated 15% of those making
$45,000 were satisfied with their income compared to 97% making
$162,500; expanding the group to include those with 25% or more
plaintiffs' personal injury produced corresponding figures of 23% and
93%.
One interpretation of these figures is that those at the lower end of
the income range among plaintiffs' personal injury practitioners look
at those who are doing extremely well and feel an acute sense of rela-
tive deprivation. This is consistent with the "winner-take-all" image.
It may also reflect a sense that the chances for moving up significantly
in income do not seem particularly positive; however, it might also
mean that the lawyers in this area are very ambitious in terms of in-
come and simply have not begun to achieve their expected goals.
B. Direct Mailers Versus the Brand Names
One clear example of conflict with the plaintiffs' bar involves the
limitations on client solicitation. Those law firms that have invested
heavily in advertising and have, through that medium, established
themselves as a "brand name" have a strong incentive to try to limit
the ability of other lawyers to reach out to clients via directmail con-
tacts in the wake of an injury producing accident. The "brand name"
firms want potential clients to think of them first; receiving a mail so-
licitation from another firm has a significant likelihood of diverting
the potential client to the mailer when, otherwise, the potential client
might have called the "brand name" firm.
It may well be the case that the kinds of clients that the "brand
name" firm wants differ from those of the direct mailer. That is, the
brand name and direct mailer firms may not actually be in all that
much competition for clients most of the time; however, the "brand
name" wants first crack at the client. Moreover, the kinds of clients
the "brand name" wants (i.e., clients with significant damages and
fairly clear liability) are more likely to want to see a lawyer before
considering a settlement than many, if not most, of the direct mailer's
potential clients; those clients, with relatively lesser damages and less
clear liability, are prime targets for quick and early settlements of-
fered by a seemingly friendly and sympathetic insurance adjuster.
Most limitations on direct mail bar such contacts by attorneys for
thirty days after an injury producing accident; this is prime time for
insurance adjusters to contact injury victims and try to reach a quick,
and almost certainly advantageous from the insurer's perspective, set-
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tlement. 71 The injury victims most likely to settle at this stage are the
bread-and-butter clients of the direct mailers, but may be of much less
importance to the "brand name" firms. Of course, the "brand name"
firms will express their opposition to direct mail not in terms of their
own interests, but rather in terms of professional dignity or concerns
about "ambulance chasing."
C. Those Handling Speculative Litigation Versus
Those Handling Routine Litigation
More important, particularly in terms of understanding the impact
of litigation such as the tobacco litigation on the plaintiffs' bar, is the
distinction between high risk, high return, speculative litigation, and
low risk, low return, routine litigation. The lawyers who undertook
the current round of tobacco cases were incurring significant risks: no
one had ever prevailed in personal injury cases against the tobacco
industry when the injury arose from the long-term exposure to to-
bacco products. In fact, it was not until 2001 that any individual had
actually collected money as compensation for an injury caused by
their own smoking. The lawyers who undertook these suits combined
a kind of risk sharing pool and significant firm-specific resources to
make the litigation viable. States turned to contingency fee arrange-
ments as a way of eliminating their own risks of having to devote sub-
stantial dollars or other resources to the litigation. The tobacco
industry poured many millions of dollars into legal fees and expert
consultant fees to fight the cases brought against them. Imagine what
difference it might have made if the states or their contingency fee
lawyers had been at risk of having to pay a significant portion of the
tobacco industry's legal expenses? It is hard to imagine that the litiga-
tion could have gone forward under that circumstance.
1. Fee Shifting
Generally, it is assumed that fee shifting rules are bad for plaintiffs;
I have made that argument in my own writing.72 However, the little
real empirical research that has been done on the subject in the U.S.
context of contingency fees shows that the picture is more complex. 73
71. Insurance adjusters are also under pressure to close claims quickly simply as a measure of
productivity. See Ross, supra note 35, at 59-60.
72. Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 A.B.A. J. 54 (1992); Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee
Arrangements and Fee Shifting: Lessons from the Experience in Ontario, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125, 136-37 (1984).
73. See James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement under the English
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J. L. & ECON. 225, 234-48 (1995); SUSANNE Di
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While fee shifting does create disincentives to litigate, particularly for
persons in the middle class who have assets that could be used to sat-
isfy a fee award, it also strengthens the hand of the plaintiff who has a
good case by effectively increasing the value of the case. Further-
more, one can imagine fee shifting regimes that include insurance for
plaintiffs against the downside risk of losing and having to pay the
other side's fee.74
For example, imagine a system where the lawyer agreed to bear the
plaintiffs' downside risk in return for receiving the "shifted" fees in
addition to the commission fee that we call a contingency fee. We
already know that most contingency fee lawyers decline most rela-
tively risky cases, and the key risk contingency fee practitioners face is
in terms of how much of their time a case will require and how much
of a fee they will actually receive.75 A significant percentage of cases
are declined because the amount that the lawyer estimates can be re-
covered will not yield a fee sufficient to cover the lawyer's time.76 If
the lawyer's fee were to include both the percentage of the recovery
and an amount paid by the defendant, the calculation changes. While
the defendant's ability to recover some of its costs from the plaintiff or
the plaintiff's lawyer, if a case results in a verdict for the defendant,
will lead some defendants in some cases to litigate rather than settle, it
is also true that the ability to recover costs from the defendant if the
case goes to trial will make a plaintiff's lawyer's threat to go to trial
more credible in a modest case. Furthermore, the additional fee will
mean that many valid cases that today are not economical for a lawyer
to handle will have the potential of producing a satisfactory fee. Some
of these cases may be quite significant and relatively clear on liability,
but simply uneconomical given current defendant practices (e.g., mod-
est but reasonably clear cut medical malpractice cases).
A lawyer-financed fee shifting system would be very problematic
for lawyers who handle speculative cases that produce fees in eight
figures or more. This litigation is speculative simply because of the
risks involved. Settlements occur, in part, because the defendants per-
PIETRO, ET AL., ALASKA'S ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY'S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 100-23
(1995); Susan Di Pietro, The English Rule at Work in Alaska, 80 JUDICATURE 88, 89 (1996).
74. These kinds of insurance schemes have been developed in England over the last half
dozen years in conjunction with the introduction of a form of contingency fee that is labeled a
"conditional fee"; see Jill Papworth, Policies to Stop You Footing the Bill After the Damage Is
Done, GUARDIAN, London, May 30, 1998, at 7; STELLA YARROW & PAMELA ABRAMS, SUM-
MARY: NOTHING TO LOSE: CLIENTS' EXPERIENCES OF USING CONDITIONAL FEES 10 (1999) (re-
port published by School of Law, University of Westminster); ACCESS 1o JUSTICE WITH
CONDmTIONAL FEES [A Lord Chancellor's Deparment Consultation Paper] §4.13 (1998).
75. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk, supra note 51, at 267.
76. Kritzer, Gatekeepers, supra note 51, at 22.
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ceive the potential cost of losing as being so high that they make a
considered business judgment about the potential costs of losing and
litigating and the risks associated with them.77 Plaintiffs' lawyers can
pursue these cases because what they put at risk is considerably less
than it would be under a fee-shifting system where they covered their
clients' downside risk. For the lawyers handling high risk cases, a fee
shifting regime such as I describe would make such cases much less
attractive.
2. Damage Caps
The plaintiffs' bar has been united in its opposition to caps on puni-
tive damages and other types of noneconomic damages, such as com-
pensation for pain and suffering. Typical caps that have been
proposed have been on the order of $250,000 and/or some link to the
amount of economic loss. 78 For most lawyers handling personal injury
cases, these caps are essentially irrelevant. For such caps to be rele-
vant, two conditions are necessary; the injuries must be such that the
lawyer can justify either a large punitive award or a large pain and
suffering award, and there must be a source of payment for a large
award.
Punitive awards in personal injury cases are quite uncommon, and
even when they do occur, they tend toward the modest side; in 1992,
less than 1% of plaintiff verdicts in tort cases in seventy-five large
counties produced punitive awards exceeding $250,000, 79 and in 1996,
the figure was considerably less than 1%.80
As for pain and suffering awards, economic damages drive most
awards and settlements, combined with a source of compensation.
The most common source of compensation is another driver's insur-
ance policy, and most of these have damage limits well below the caps
that have been discussed. The problem for most lawyers is making a
case for significant pain and suffering damages. One could readily im-
agine reforms in noneconomic damages that would actually work to
the advantage of most lawyers: place some limits at the upper end, but
77. An excellent example of this kind of decision can be seen in the litigation over Bendectin.
Ultimately Merrill Dow prevailed but the company sought to avoid the costs of litigation and the
potential costs of losing by agreeing to a $180 million settlement. The litigation proceeded be-
cause the class certification that was central to that settlement was thrown out by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. On the history of the Bendectin litigation see JOSEPH SANDERS,
BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORr LITIGATION 35-39 (1998).
78. Mark B. Greenlee, Kramer v. Java World: Images, Issues, and Idols in the Debate Over
Tort Reform, 26 CAP. U.L. REV. 701, 726 (1997).
79. DeFrances, et al., supra note 47, at 8.
80. DEFRANCES & LITRAS, supra note 47, at 9.
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permit plaintiffs' lawyers to prove pain and suffering through per
diem arguments; or alternatively, set some statutory guideline for
noneconomic damages in routine cases that is indexed to the cost of
living. The idea that some mechanism other than juries would be used
to set noneconomic damages is an anathema to most plaintiffs' law-
yers, but for those working with low end, routine injuries something
other than the "shadow of the jury" might be more effective and actu-
ally produce increased compensation for injuries where pain is a ma-
jor component. While there is an assumption that juries are more
favorable to plaintiffs than are judges, empirical evidence is beginning
to mount that calls that assumption into question.81
These arguments may also apply for major medical malpractice
cases. The cases in which the largest damages are paid are not driven
by pain and suffering but by the high cost of long-term intensive medi-
cal care. The standard line about punitive damages and noneconomic
damages is that it is the threat of huge awards that convince defend-
ants and insurers to make realistic settlement offers for economic
damages. However, in most types of cases, the threat of massive eco-
nomic damages associated with long-term medical care is more than
enough to convince a defendant to settle these cases. Again, the as-
sumption that juries are the key to reasonable compensation may not
be true in medical malpractice cases. In 1996, the median medical
malpractice award by a judge was $454,000 compared to about half
that ($254,000) by a jury. 82 Similarly, judges found for plaintiffs in
38% of medical malpractice trials compared to juries, which found for
plaintiffs in only 23% of trials.83
Given that the controversy over damage caps is often tied to "out of
control juries," one might imagine a situation where a compromise
over damage caps might be that such caps would apply only to jury
trials requested by plaintiffs. That is, if a plaintiff agreed to have a
case tried by a judge, then no cap would apply. A defendant could
81. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiri-
cism, 77 CORNFLL L. REV. 1124, 1125-26 (1992); William Glaberson, A Study's Verdict: Jury
Awards Are Not Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, August 6, 2001, at A9 (reporting on forthcoming
study by Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study,
87 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming March 2002). I have been told by a number of plaintiffs'
lawyers that, in today's climate, they would just as soon try a routine soft tissue injury case to a
judge than to a jury. In fact, 1996 verdict data from the 75 largest counties in the U.S. show that
in automobile tort cases, the median award by judges was higher ($20,000) than the median
award by juries ($18,000), and that judges's verdicts were more likely to exceed $250,000 (12.2%
versus 8.4%) or $1 million (7.1% versus 3.0%) than were juries. See DEFRANCES & LiTRAS,
supra note 47, at 8.
82. DEFRANCES & LrrRAS, supra note 47, at 8.
83. Id. at 6.
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insist on a jury trial, but in doing so, the defendant would waive any
damage caps.84
This type of compromise might be very attractive to lawyers han-
dling large cases other than what I have termed "speculative" cases. It
is in the most speculative cases where the uncertainty about extreme
jury verdicts is most important, and the type of limitation I described
would be most threatening to those lawyers.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal profession in the United States is heterogeneous along
many dimensions, ranging from social background to clientele. While
members of the profession ostensibly share a background of legal
training and an interest in the well-being of the profession, this com-
monality is eclipsed by cleavages that range from economic interest to
political outlook. Within the swirl of diverging views and interests,
the plaintiffs' bar, a.k.a. "trial lawyers," might seem to be a group of
lawyers with a strong shared core of interests and outlooks. Politi-
cally, the organized plaintiffs' bar has supported politicians, most
often Democrats, who oppose changes in the civil justice system that,
on first view, seem anti-plaintiff. How real is this supposed common-
ality of interest?
In this Article, I have discussed recent developments that begin to
raise questions about the commonality of interests within the range of
lawyers who represent plaintiffs on a contingency basis. The kinds of
cases handled by identifiable subgroups within the plaintiffs' bar differ
in ways that reflect conflicts of interest with other plaintiffs' lawyers
rather than commonalities. I have illustrated these conflicts by look-
ing at a variety of issues on most of which the plaintiffs' bar has tradi-
tionally taken a united stand:
" fee shifting (losers pay)
" damage caps
" right to jury trial
" client solicitation
In discussing these various issues, I have outlined ways in which
changes might be made that would be advantageous to some segments
of the plaintiffs' bar and their clients, but disadvantageous to other
segments. Some of the "proposals" I have advanced would be signifi-
cant departures from current practice, and none of them are by any
84. l am not proposing this as a system change. There are a variety of side impacts that would
need to be examined, the most obvious of which would be the increased role of judges, and the
implications of that for judicial selection processes.
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means fully developed as policy proposals to be considered in the im-
mediate future. However, they do provide a prism to help us think
about the conflicts within the plaintiffs' bar.
What difference will it make when and if the plaintiffs' bar begins to
realize the nature of these conflicts? One possible insight into that
question is the one example listed above where conflict has already
occurred: client solicitation. Generally, the "establishment" of the
plaintiffs' bar, lawyers who tend to be extremely successful practition-
ers who have no need to rely upon direct mail, has sought to take the
supposed "high" road by endorsing strictures on direct solicitation.
The primary defenders of direct mail are those who do use it, or think
they might use it at some point in the future. Most plaintiffs' lawyers
sit on the sideline of this battle, if for no other reason that a letter
from an unknown plaintiffs' lawyer may lead someone to contact them
based upon their local reputation because the injured person was
prompted by the letter to "ask around" for an idea of lawyers to con-
tact.8 5 In other words, the split within the plaintiffs' bar is right where
one would expect to find it: in the wallet. There is no reason to expect
differing responses should some of the other issues I have outlined
arise.
The practice of law is "a changin'," to paraphrase Bob Dylan. The
economic structures that have governed the work of the personal ser-
vices sector is shifting in significant ways in the United States and in
other countries as well.86 While the underlying causes of change are
complex, the result is the transformation of the economics of personal
services practice. The common result will be increasing stratification
and conflict among lawyers who previously shared a set of interests
because of the common plight of their client base.
85. In fact, one survey of recipients of direct mail found that only 11 percent of those recipi-
ents who hired a lawyer actually hired a lawyer from whom they had received a mailing. Some
significant percentage beyond the 11 percent undoubtedly were prompted to contact a lawyer by
the letter. See Kritzer & Krishnan, Lawyers Seeking Clients, supra note 51, at 353.
86. For an extension of the arguments presented in this paper to England, see Herbert M.
Kritzer, The Fracturing Legal Profession: The Case of Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Lawyers (paper
presented at the W.G. Hart Workshop, Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, London, England,
June 26-28, 2001; available at http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/-kritzer/research/legalprof/hart.pdf)
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001). This paper will appear in the International Journal of the Legal
Profession in 2002 or 2003.
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